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Abstract. Takeuti and Titani have introduced and investigated a logic
they called intuitionistic fuzzy logic. This logic is characterized as the
first-order Go¨del logic based on the truth value set [0, 1]. The logic is
known to be axiomatizable, but no deduction system amenable to proof-
theoretic, and hence, computational treatment, has been known. Such a
system is presented here, based on previous work on hypersequent calculi
for propositional Go¨del logics by Avron. It is shown that the system is
sound and complete, and allows cut-elimination. A question by Takano
regarding the eliminability of the Takeuti-Titani density rule is answered
affirmatively.
1 Introduction
Intuitionistic fuzzy logic IF was originally defined by Takeuti and Titani to be
the logic of the complete Heyting algebra [0, 1]. In standard many-valued termi-
nology, IF is [0, 1]-valued first-order Go¨del logic, with truth functions as defined
below. The finite-valued propositional versions of this logic were introduced by
Go¨del [8], and have spawned a sizeable area of logical research subsumed under
the title “intermediate logics” (intermediate between classical and intuitionistic
logic). The infinite-valued propositional Go¨del logic was studied by Dummett
[6], who showed that it is axiomatized by LC, i.e., intuitionistic propositional
logic plus the linearity axiom (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A).
Takeuti and Titani [13] characterized IF by a calculus which extends the
intuitionistic predicate calculus LJ by several axioms as well as the density rule
Γ ⊢ A ∨ (C ⊃ p) ∨ (p ⊃ B)
Γ ⊢ A ∨ (C ⊃ B)
tt′
This rule can be read as expressing the fact that the set of truth values is
densely ordered. In this sense, the Takeuti-Titani axiomatization is the natural
axiomatization of the [0, 1]-valued Go¨del logic. The valid formulas of IF are
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also characterized as those formulas valid in every first-order Go¨del logic based
on a linearly ordered set of truth-values (this is obvious for all logics based on
truth value sets ⊆ [0, 1], since a countermodel in such a truth-value set can be
straightforwardly embedded in [0, 1]. The general claim was established by Horn
[10]). In this characterization, the density rule is not a natural assumption, since
not every linearly ordered truth-value set is densely ordered. It follows from
this characterization that the density rule is redundant for the axiomatization
of IF, and completeness proofs without it have been given by Horn [10] and
Takano [11].1 Takano posed the question of whether a syntactic elimination of
the density rule is also possible.
More recently, another axiomatizable first-order extension of LC has been
studied by Corsi [4, 5] and Avellone et al. [1]. This extension is defined not via
many-valued semantics but as the class of formulas valid in all linearly ordered
intuitionistic Kripke models. It is different from IF; specifically, the formula
(∨∀) below is not valid in it. IF can, however, also be characterized as the set
of formulas valid in all linearly ordered Kripke models with constant domains
(this was first observed by Gabbay [7, §3]).
The interest of IF lies in the fact that it combines properties of logics for
approximate reasoning with properties of intuitionistic logic. On the one hand,
IF is one of the basic t-norm logics (see Ha´jek [9]), on the other, it is an extension
of intuitionistic logic which corresponds to concurrency (as has been argued by
Avron [2]). We present here a calculus for IF which is adequate for further proof-
theoretic study. The basic result in this regard is the cut-elimination theorem
for this calculus, from which a midhypersequent-theorem can be derived. This
theorem, in turn, corresponds to Herbrand’s Theorem in classical logic, and as
such is a possible basis for automated theorem proving in IF.
The calculus also allows us to investigate the proof-theoretic effects of the
Takeuti-Titani rule. We give a positive answer to Takano’s question, showing that
the density rule can be eliminated from IF-proofs. A simple example illustrates
the possible structural differences between proofs with and without the Takeuti-
Titani rule.
2 Syntax and Semantics of Intuitionistic Fuzzy Logic
The language L of IF is a usual first-order language with propositional variables
and where free (a, b, . . . ) and bound (x, y, . . . ) variables are distinguished.
Definition 1. An IF-interpretation ℑ = 〈D, s〉 is given by the domain D and
the valuation function s. Let LD be L extended by constants for each element of
D. Then s maps atomic formulas in Frm(LD) into [0, 1], d ∈ D to itself, n-ary
function symbols to functions from Dn to D, and free variables to elements of D.
The valuation function s can be extended in the obvious way to a function
on all terms. The valuation for formulas is defined as follows:
1 Note that the corresponding axiom (∀p)((A ⊃ p) ∨ (p ⊃ B)) ⊃ (A ⊃ B) is not
redundant in quantified propositional [0, 1]-valued Go¨del logic. See [3].
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1. A ≡ P (t1, . . . , tn) is atomic: ℑ(A) = s(P )(s(t1), . . . , s(tn)).
2. A ≡ ¬B:
ℑ(¬B) =
{
0 if ℑ(B) 6= 0
1 otherwise.
3. A ≡ B ∧ C: ℑ(B ∧ C) = min(ℑ(B),ℑ(C)).
4. A ≡ B ∨ C: ℑ(B ∨ C) = max(ℑ(A),ℑ(B)).
5. A ≡ B ⊃ C:
ℑ(B ⊃ C) =
{
ℑ(C) if ℑ(B) > ℑ(C)
1 if ℑ(B) ≤ ℑ(C).
The set Distrℑ(A(x)) = {ℑ(A(d)) : d ∈ D} is called the distribution of A(x). The
quantifiers are, as usual, defined by infimum and supremum of their distributions.
(6) A ≡ (∀x)B(x): ℑ(A) = inf Distrℑ(B(x)).
(7) A ≡ (∃x)B(x): ℑ(A) = supDistrℑ(B(x)).
ℑ satisfies a formula A, ℑ |= A, if ℑ(A) = 1. A formula A is IF-valid if every
IF-interpretation satisfies it.
Note that, as in intuitionistic logic, ¬A may be defined as A ⊃ ⊥, where ⊥
is some formula that always takes the value 0.
3 Hypersequents and IF
Takeuti and Titani’s system IF is based on Gentzen’s sequent calculus LJ for
intuitionistic logic with a number of extra axioms
⊢ (A ⊃ B) ∨ ((A ⊃ B) ⊃ B)
(A ⊃ B) ⊃ B ⊢ (B ⊃ A) ∨B
(A ∧B) ⊃ C ⊢ (A ⊃ C) ∨ (B ⊃ C)
(A ⊃ (B ∨ C)) ⊢ (A ⊃ B) ∨ (A ⊃ C)
(∀x)(A(x) ∨B) ⊢ (∀x)A(x) ∨B
(∀x)A(x) ⊃ C ⊢ (∃x)(A(x) ⊃ D) ∨ (D ⊃ C)
(Ax1)
(Ax2)
(Ax3)
(Ax4)
(∨∀)
(∀ ⊃)
(where x does not occur in B or D) and the following additional inference rule:
Γ ⊢ A ∨ (C ⊃ p) ∨ (p ⊃ B)
Γ ⊢ A ∨ (C ⊃ B)
tt ′
where p is a propositional eigenvariable (i.e., it does not occur in the lower
sequent). It is known that the extra inference rule is redundant. In fact, the
system H of Horn [10] consisting of LJ plus the schemata
(∀x)(A(x) ∨B) ⊃ (∀x)A(x) ∨B
(A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A)
(∨∀)
(D)
is complete for IF (see also [11]). Neither of these systems, however, has decent
proof-theoretic properties such as cut elimination, nor is a syntactic method for
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the elimination of the Takeuti-Titani rule (tt ′) known. Takano [11] has posed
the question of a syntactic elimination procedure of the Takeuti-Titani rule as
an open problem.
We present a system which has the required properties, and which allows
the syntactic elimination of the Takeuti-Titani rule. Our system is based on
Avron’s [2] cut-free axiomatization of LC using a hypersequent calculus.
Definition 2. A sequent is an expression of the form
Γ ⊢ ∆
where Γ and ∆ are finite multisets of formulas, and ∆ contains at most one
formula. A hypersequent is a finite multiset of sequents, written as
Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 | . . . | Γn ⊢ ∆n
The hypersequent calculus HIF has the following axioms and rules:
Axioms: A ⊢ A, for any formula A.
Internal structural rules:
G | Γ ⊢ ∆
G | A,Γ ⊢ ∆
iw ⊢
G | Γ ⊢
G | Γ ⊢ A
⊢ iw
G | A,A, Γ ⊢ ∆
G | A,Γ ⊢ ∆
ic ⊢
External structural rules:
G
G | Γ ⊢ ∆
ew
G | Γ ⊢ ∆ | Γ ⊢ ∆
G | Γ ⊢ ∆
ec
Logical rules:
G | Γ ⊢ A
G | ¬A,Γ ⊢
¬ ⊢
G | A,Γ ⊢
G | Γ ⊢ ¬A
⊢ ¬
G | A,Γ ⊢ ∆ G | B,Γ ⊢ ∆
G | A ∨B,Γ ⊢ ∆
∨ ⊢
G | Γ ⊢ A G | Γ ⊢ B
G | Γ ⊢ A ∧B
⊢ ∧
G | Γ ⊢ A
G | Γ ⊢ A ∨B
⊢ ∨1
G | A,Γ ⊢ ∆
G | A ∧B,Γ ⊢ ∆
∧ ⊢1
G | Γ ⊢ B
G | Γ ⊢ A ∨B
⊢ ∨2
G | B,Γ ⊢ ∆
G | A ∧B,Γ ⊢ ∆
∧ ⊢2
G | Γ1 ⊢ A G | B,Γ2 ⊢ ∆
G | A ⊃ B,Γ1, Γ2 ⊢ ∆
⊃⊢
G | A,Γ ⊢ B
G | Γ ⊢ A ⊃ B
⊢⊃
G | A(t), Γ ⊢ ∆
G | (∀x)A(x), Γ ⊢ ∆
∀ ⊢
G | Γ ⊢ A(a)
G | Γ ⊢ (∀x)A(x)
⊢ ∀
G | A(a), Γ ⊢ ∆
G | (∃x)A(x), Γ ⊢ ∆
∃ ⊢
G | Γ ⊢ A(t)
G | Γ ⊢ (∃x)A(x)
⊢ ∃
Cut:
G | Γ ⊢ A G | A,Π ⊢ Λ
G | Γ,Π ⊢ Λ
cut
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Communication:
G | Θ1, Θ′1 ⊢ Ξ1 G | Θ2, Θ
′
2 ⊢ Ξ2
G | Θ1, Θ′2 ⊢ Ξ1 | Θ
′
1, Θ2 ⊢ Ξ2
cm
Density:
G | Φ ⊢ p | p, Ψ ⊢ Σ
G | Φ, Ψ ⊢ Σ
tt
The rules (⊢ ∀), (∃ ⊢), and (tt) are subject to eigenvariable conditions: the free
variable a and the propositional variable p, respectively, must not occur in the
lower hypersequent. We denote the calculus obtained from HIF by omitting the
cut rule by HIF−, and that obtained by omitting (tt) by HIF∗.
The semantics of IF can easily be extended to hypersequents by mapping a
hypersequent H
Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 | . . . | Γn ⊢ ∆n
to the formula H∗
(
∧
Γ1 ⊃
∨
∆1) ∨ . . . ∨ (
∧
Γn ⊃
∨
∆n)
where
∧
Γi denotes the conjunction of the formulas in Γi or ⊤ if Γi is empty,
and
∨
∆i the disjunction of the formulas in ∆i or ⊥ if ∆i is empty. Deriving a
formula A in HIF then is equivalent to deriving the sequent ⊢ A: the translation
of ⊢ A, i.e., ⊤ ⊃ A is equivalent to A.
Theorem 3 (Soundness). Every hypersequent H derivable inHIF is IF-valid.
Proof. By induction on the length of the proof. It will suffice to show that the
axioms are valid, and that the quantifier rules and (tt) preserve validity.
The soundness of the quantifier rules is established by observing that corre-
sponding quantifier shifting rules are intuitionistically valid. For instance, since
(∃x)(B ∨ A(x)) ⊃ (B ∨ (∃x)A(x))
(∃x)(B ⊃ A(x)) ⊃ B ⊃ (∃x)A(x)
(∨∃)
(⊃∃)
are intuitionistically valid, it is easily seen that ⊢∃ is a sound rule. The only
problematic rules are (⊢∀) and (∃⊢). Suppose G | Γ ⊢ A(a) is derivable in
HIF. By induction hypothesis, G∗ ∨ (
∧
Γ ⊃ A(a)) is valid. Then certainly
(∀x)(G∗ ∨ (
∧
Γ ⊃ A(x))) is IF-valid. Since a did not occur in G or Γ , we may
now assume that x does not either. Since the quantifier shift (∨∀), i.e.,
(∀x)(B ∨ A(x)) ⊃ (B ∨ (∀x)A(x)),
is valid in IF, we see that G∗ ∨ (∀x)(
∧
Γ ⊃ A(x)) is valid. The result follows
since
(∀x)(B ⊃ A(x)) ⊃ B ⊃ (∀x)A(x)
is intuitionistically valid, and hence IF-valid.
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The communication rule is sound as well. Suppose the interpretation ℑ sat-
isfies the premises of (cm). The only case where the conclusion is not obviously
also satisfied is if ℑ(Θ′1) ≤ ℑ(Ξ1) and ℑ(Θ
′
2) ≤ ℑ(Ξ2). If the left lower sequent
is not satisfied, we have ℑ(Ξ1) < ℑ(Θ′2), and hence ℑ(Θ
′
1) ≤ ℑ(Ξ2), and thus
the right lower sequent is satisfied. Similarly if the right lower sequent is not
satisfied.
For (tt) we may argue as follows: Suppose that the hypersequent
H = G | Φ ⊢ p | p, Ψ ⊢ Σ
is IF-valid. Let ℑ be an interpretation, and let ℑr be just like ℑ except that
ℑ(p) = r. Since p does not occur in the conclusion hypersequent
H ′ = G | Φ, Ψ ⊢ Σ
we have ℑ(H ′) = ℑr(H ′) and ℑ(G) = ℑr(G). If ℑ |= G we are done. Otherwise,
assume that ℑ 6|= H ′, i.e.,
r1 = min{ℑ(Φ),ℑ(Ψ)} > ℑ(Σ) = r2
Let r = (r1+ r2)/2. Now consider ℑr: ℑr 6|= G by assumption; ℑr 6|= Φ ⊢ p, since
ℑr(Φ) > r; and ℑr 6|= p, Ψ ⊢ Σ, since ℑr(Ψ) > r > ℑr(Σ). Hence, ℑr 6|= H , a
contradiction. ⊓⊔
Theorem 4 (Completeness). Every IF-valid hypersequent is derivable inHIF.
Proof. Observe that a hypersequent H and its canonical translation ⊢ H∗ are
interderivable using the cut rule and the following derivable hypersequents
A ∨B ⊢ A | A ∨B ⊢ B A ⊃ B,A ⊢ B
A ∧B ⊢ A A ⊢ A ∨B
Thus it suffices to show that the characteristic axioms of IF are derivable; a
simple induction on the length of proofs shows that proofs in intuitionistic pred-
icate calculus together with the axioms (D) and (∨∀) can be simulated in HIF.
The formula (D) is easily derivable using the communication rule.
A ⊢ A B ⊢ B
A ⊢ B | B ⊢ A
cm
⊢ A ⊃ B | B ⊢ A
⊢⊃
⊢ A ⊃ B | ⊢ B ⊃ A
⊢⊃
⊢ (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A) | ⊢ B ⊃ A
⊢ ∨
⊢ (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A) | ⊢ (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A)
⊢ ∨
⊢ (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A)
ec
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The formula (∨∀) can be obtained thus:
A(a) ⊢ A(a) B ⊢ B
B ⊢ A(a) | A(a) ⊢ B
cm
B ⊢ B
B ⊢ A(a) | B ⊢ B
ew
B ⊢ A(a) | B ∨A(a) ⊢ B
∨ ⊢
A(a) ⊢ A(a)
A(a) ⊢ A(a) | B ∨A(a) ⊢ B
ew
B ∨A(a) ⊢ A(a) | B ∨A(a) ⊢ B
∨ ⊢
(∀x)(B ∨A(x)) ⊢ A(a) | B ∨A(a) ⊢ B
∀ ⊢
(∀x)(B ∨A(x)) ⊢ A(a) | (∀x)(B ∨A(x)) ⊢ B
∀ ⊢
(∀x)(B ∨A(x)) ⊢ (∀x)A(x) | (∀x)(B ∨A(x)) ⊢ B
⊢ ∀
(∀x)(B ∨A(x)) ⊢ B ∨ (∀x)A(x)
⊢ ∨
The last line is obtained from the preceding by two (⊢∨) inferences, followed by
an external contraction. We indicate this with the double inference line. ⊓⊔
Of course, the other axioms of Takeuti’s and Titani’s system are also deriv-
able. We will leave the propositional axioms 1–4 as an exercise to the reader,
and give the derivation on of (∀ ⊃) as another example:
A(a) ⊢ A(a) D ⊢ D
A(a) ⊢ D | D ⊢ A(a)
cm
⊢ A(a) ⊃ D | D ⊢ A(a)
⊢⊃
⊢ (∃x)(A(x) ⊃ D) | D ⊢ A(a)
⊢ ∃
⊢ (∃x)(A(x) ⊃ D) | D ⊢ (∀x)A(x)
⊢ ∀
C ⊢ C
⊢ (∃x)(A(x) ⊃ D) | C ⊢ C
ew
⊢ (∃x)(A(x) ⊃ D) | (∀x)A(x) ⊃ C,D ⊢ C
⊃⊢
⊢ (∃x)(A(x) ⊃ D) | (∀x)A(x) ⊃ C ⊢ D ⊃ C
⊢⊃
(∀x)A(x) ⊃ C ⊢ (∃x)(A(x) ⊃ D) ∨ (D ⊃ C)
⊢ ∨
4 Cut Elimination and Midhypersequent Theorem
Theorem 5 (Cut Elimination). Any derivation of a hypersequent G in HIF
can be transformed into a derivation of G in HIF−.
This theorem is proved in the usual way by induction on the number of appli-
cations of the cut rule, using the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Suppose the hypersequents
H1 = G | Γ ⊢ A and H2 = G | Π ⊢ Λ
are cut-free derivable. Then
H = G | Γ,Π∗ ⊢ Λ
where Π∗ is obtained from Π by removing all occurrences of A, is cut-free prov-
able, and the number of applications of (ec) in the resulting proof is not more
than the sum of applications of (ec) in γ and δ.
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Proof. Let γ and δ be the cut-free proofs of G and H , respectively. We may
assume, renaming variables if necessary, that the eigenvariables in γ and δ are
distinct. The proof follows Gentzen’s original Hauptsatz. Define the following
measures on the pair 〈γ, δ〉: the rank r = len(γ)+ len(δ), the degree d = deg(A),
and the order o is the number of applications of the (ec) rule in γ, δ. We proceed
by induction on the lexicographical order of 〈d, o, r〉.
If either H1 or H2 is an axiom, then H can be derived from H1 or H2,
respectively, using only weakenings. (This includes the case where r = 2).
Otherwise, we distinguish cases according to the last inferences in γ and δ.
The induction hypothesis is that the claim of the lemma is true whenever the
degree is < d or is = d and either the order < o, or the order = o and the rank
< r.
(1) γ or δ ends in an inference which acts on a sequent in G. We may invoke
the induction hypothesis on the premises ofH1 orH2, andH2 orG2, respectively.
(2) γ or δ ends in (ec). For instance, γ ends in
.... γ
′
G | Γ ⊢ A | Γ ⊢ A
G | Γ ⊢ A
ec
Apply the induction hypothesis to γ′ and δ. The resulting proof γ′′ of
G | Γ ⊢ A | Γ,Π∗ ⊢ Λ
has one less (ec) than γ (although it may be much longer), and so the induction
hypothesis applies again to γ′′ and δ.
(3) γ or δ end in another structural inference, (tt), or (cm): These cases are
unproblematic applications of the induction hypothesis to the premises, followed
by applications of structural inferences.
For example, assume γ ends in (cm), i.e.,
.... γ1
G | Θ1, Θ′1 ⊢ Ξ1
.... γ2
G | Θ2, Θ′2 ⊢ A
G | Θ1, Θ′2 ⊢ Ξ1 | Θ
′
1, Θ2 ⊢ A
cm
where Γ = Θ′1, Θ2. Apply the deduction hypothesis to the right premise and H2
to obtain a cut-free proof of
G | Θ2, Θ
′
2, Π
∗ ⊢ Λ
Using applications of (ew) and (cm), we obtain the desired result.
The case of (tt) may be of special interest. Suppose γ ends in(tt), with
G | Φ ⊢ p | p, Ψ ⊢ A
G | Φ, Ψ ⊢ A
tt
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Apply the induction hypothesis to the premises of H1 and H2, and apply (tt) to
obtain the desired proof:
G | Φ ⊢ p | p, Ψ,Π∗ ⊢ Λ
G | Φ, Ψ,Π∗ ⊢ Λ
tt
The case of δ ending in (tt) is handled similarly.
(4) γ ends in a logical inference not involving the cut formula, or δ ends in
a logical inference not involving the cut formula. These cases are easily handled
by appeal to the induction hypothesis and application of appropriate logical and
structural inferences. We outline the case where γ ends in (⊃⊢):
.... γ1
G | C, Γ ⊢ A
.... γ2
G | Γ ⊢ B
G | B ⊃ C, Γ ⊢ A
⊃⊢
We apply the induction hypothesis to the left premise and H2, and apply (⊃⊢):
G | C, Γ,Π∗ ⊢ Λ G | Γ ⊢ B
G | B ⊃ C, Γ,Π∗ ⊢ Λ
(5) Both γ and δ end in logical inferences acting on a cut formula. For
instance, if A = B ⊃ C we have
.... γ1
G | B,Γ ⊢ C
G | Γ ⊢ B ⊃ C
⊢⊃
.... δ1
G | Π1 ⊢ B
.... δ2
G | C,Π2 ⊢ Λ
G | B ⊃ C,Π1, Π2 ⊢ Λ
⊃⊢
First we find proofs δ′1 and δ
′
2 of
G | Γ,Π∗1 ⊢ B and G | C, Γ,Π
∗
2 ⊢ Λ
either by applying the induction hypothesis to γ and δ1 or δ2 if Π1 or Π2,
respectively, contain B ⊃ C, or otherwise by adding (ic)-inferences to δ1 and
δ2. Now apply the induction hypothesis based on the reduced degree of the cut
formulas twice: first to δ′1 and γ1 to obtain G | Γ, Γ,Π
∗
1 ⊢ C, and then to the
resulting proof and δ′2 to obtain
G | Γ, Γ, Γ,Π∗1 , Π
∗
2 ⊢ Λ.
The desired result follows by several applications of (ic).
The other cases are similar and are left to the reader. ⊓⊔
Cut elimination is a basic prerequisite for proof theoretic and computational
treatments of a logic. As an immediate consequence of cut elimination we have
the subformula property: every IF-valid formula has a proof which only contains
subformulas of the endformula (plus possibly propositional variables used in (tt)).
Another important corollary is the midhypersequent theorem. It corresponds to
Herbrand’s Theorem for classical logic and is thus the basis for any resolution-
style automated proof method.
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Theorem 7. Any hypersequent H with only prefix formulas has a proof where
no propositional inference follows a quantifier inference. Such a proof contains
one or more hypersequents M , called midhypersequents, so that M contains no
quantifiers, all the inferences above M are propositional or structural, and all
the inferences below M are either quantifier inferences of structural inferences.
Proof. This is proved exactly as for the classical and intuitionistic case (see
Takeuti [12]). First, observe that all axioms are cut-free derivable from atomic
axioms. The cut-elimination theorem thus provides us with a cut-free proof pi
of H from atomic axioms. Next, observe that the (∨ ⊢) rule can be simulated
without using cuts by the rule
G | A,Γ ⊢ ∆1 G | B,Γ ⊢ ∆2
G | A ∨B,Γ ⊢ ∆1 | A ∨B,Γ ⊢ ∆2
∨ ⊢′
The rule can be derived as follows (we omit side sequents):
A,Γ ⊢ ∆1 B,Γ ⊢ ∆2
B,Γ ⊢ ∆1 | A,Γ ⊢ ∆2
cm
A,Γ ⊢ ∆1
A ∨B,Γ ⊢ ∆1 | A,Γ ⊢ ∆2
∨ ⊢
B,Γ ⊢ ∆2
A ∨B,Γ ⊢ ∆1 | A ∨B,Γ ⊢ ∆2
∨ ⊢
Of course, (∨ ⊢′) together with (ec) simulates (∨ ⊢). We replace all applications
of (∨ ⊢) by applications of (∨ ⊢′) in our cut-free proof.
Define the order of a quantifier inference in pi to be the number of propo-
sitional inferences under it, and the order of pi as the sum of the orders of its
quantifier inferences. The proof is by induction on the order of pi. The only in-
teresting case is of (∨ ⊢′) occurring below a quantifier inference, since this case
does not work for intuitionistic logic.
Suppose pi contains a (⊢ ∀) inference above a (∨ ⊢′) inference, and so that
all the inferences in between are structural. We have the following situation:
....
G | A,Γ ⊢ ∆
.... δ
′
G′ | Γ ′ ⊢ A(a)
G′ | Γ ′ ⊢ (∀x)A(x)
⊢ ∀
.... δ
G | B,Γ ⊢ (∀x)A(x)
G | A ∨B,Γ ⊢ ∆ | A ∨B,Γ ⊢ (∀x)A(x)
∨ ⊢′
where δ contains only structural inferences. We reduce the order of pi by replacing
this part of pi by:
....
G | A,Γ ⊢ ∆
.... δ
′
G′ | Γ ′ ⊢ A(a)
.... δ
G | B,Γ ⊢ A(a)
G | A ∨B,Γ ⊢ ∆ | A ∨B,Γ ⊢ A(a)
∨ ⊢′
G | A ∨B,Γ ⊢ ∆ | A ∨B,Γ ⊢ (∀x)A(x)
⊢ ∀
⊓⊔
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5 Elimination of the Takeuti-Titani Rule
The Takeuti-Titani rule is the least understood feature of the original Takeuti-
Titani axiomatization of IF. We show below that the rule can be eliminated from
proofs in HIF. This had been posed as a problem by Takano [11]. The proof is
by induction on the number of applications of (tt) and the length of the proof.
The exact complexity of the elimination procedure is still to be investigated. The
(tt) rule can have significant effects on proof structure. For instance, one of the
calculi in Avron [2] uses the split rule
G | Γ, Γ ′ ⊢ ∆
G | Γ ⊢ ∆ | Γ ′ ⊢ ∆
split
If this rule is added to HIF, it is possible to transform proofs so that each
application of the communication rule has a premise which is a propositional
axiom. This is not possible without (tt). The transformation works by replacing
each occurrence of the communication rule by
q ⊢ q
p ⊢ p
G1 | Γ1, Γ
′
1 ⊢ A1
G1 | Γ1 ⊢ A1 | Γ
′
1 ⊢ A1
split
G1 | Γ1 ⊢ A1 ⊢ Γ
′
1 ⊢ p | p ⊢ A1
cm
G1 | Γ1 ⊢ A1 | Γ
′
1 ⊢ q | p ⊢ A1 | q ⊢ p
cm
G2 | Γ2, Γ
′
2 ⊢ A2
G2 | Γ2 ⊢ A2 | Γ
′
2 ⊢ A2
split
q ⊢ q
G2 | Γ2 ⊢ q | q ⊢ A2 | Γ
′
2 ⊢ A2
cm
G1 | G2 | Γ1 ⊢ A1 | Γ2 ⊢ q | p ⊢ A1 | Γ2 ⊢ p | q ⊢ A2 | Γ
′
2 ⊢ A2
cut
G1 | G2 | Γ1 ⊢ A1 | Γ2 ⊢ A2 | p ⊢ A1 | Γ2 ⊢ p | Γ
′
2 ⊢ A2
tt
G1 | G2 | Γ1 ⊢ A1 | Γ2 ⊢ A2 | Γ2 ⊢ A1 | Γ
′
2 ⊢ A2
tt
G1 | G2 | Γ1, Γ
′
2 ⊢ A1 | Γ
′
1, Γ2 ⊢ A2
Proposition 8. Let δ be a HIF∗-derivation of hypersequent H with length k,
where H is of the form
G | Γ1, Π1 ⊢ ∆1, Π
′
1 | . . . | Γn, Πn ⊢ ∆n, Π
′
n
and
⋃
Πi ⊆ {p}, Π ′i = ∅, and p does not occur in G, Γi or ∆i (
⋃
Π ′i = {p},
Πi = ∅, and p does not occur in G, Γi or ∆i).
Then the hypersequent G | Γi1 ⊢ ∆i1 | . . . | Γim ⊢ ∆im is derivable in length
≤ k.
Proof. Easy induction on k. Every occurrence of p must arise from a weakening,
simply delete all these weakenings.
Theorem 9. Applications of (tt) can be eliminated from HIF-derivations.
This follows from the following lemma by induction on the number of applica-
tions of (tt) in a given HIF−-derivation.
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Lemma 10. If δ is an HIF∗-derivation of
H = G | Φ1 ⊢ Π1 | . . . Φn ⊢ Πn | Π
′
1, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | Π
′
m, Ψm ⊢ Σm,
where p does not occur in G, Φi, Ψi or Σi, and
⋃
Πi ∪
⋃
Π ′i ⊆ {p}, then there
is a HIF∗-derivation of
H∗ = G | Φ1, . . . , Φn, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | Φ1, . . . , Φn, Ψm ⊢ Σm.
Proof. By induction on the length of δ. We distinguish cases according to the
last inference I in δ. For simplicity, we will write p in what follows below instead
of Πi or Π
′
i with the understanding that it denotes an arbitrary multiset of p’s.
(1) The conclusion of of I is so that p only occurs on the right side of sequents,
or only on the left side. Then Prop. 8 applies, and the desired hypersequent can
be derived without (tt).
(2) I applies to sequents in G. Then the induction hypothesis can be applied
to the premise(s) of I and appropriate inferences added below.
(3) I is structural inference other than (cut) and (cm), or a logical inference
with only one premise, or a logical inference which applies to aΣi. These cases are
likewise handled in an obvious manner and are unproblematic. One instructive
example might be the case of (⊃⊢). Here the premises would be of the form, say,
G | Φ1 ⊢ p | Φ2 ⊢ p . . . | Φn ⊢ p | p, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | p, Ψm ⊢ Σm | p, Γ1 ⊢ A
G | Φ1 ⊢ p | Φ2 ⊢ p . . . | Φn ⊢ p | p, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | p, Ψm ⊢ Σm | B,Γ2 ⊢ p
Let Φ = Φ1, . . . , Φn. The induction hypothesis provides us with
G | Φ, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | Φ, Ψm ⊢ Σm | Φ, Γ1 ⊢ A
G | B,Γ2, Φ, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | B,Γ2, Φ, Ψm ⊢ Σm
We obtain the desired hypersequent by applying (⊃⊢) successively m times,
together with some contractions.
(4) I is a cut. There are several cases to consider, most of which are routine.
The only tricky case is when the cut formula is p and p occurs both on the left
and the right side of sequents in both premises of the cut. For simplicity, let us
consider the cut rule in its multiplicate formulation
G | Φ1 ⊢ p | . . . | Φn ⊢ p | p, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | p, Ψm ⊢ Σm | Γ ⊢ p
G | Φ1 ⊢ p | . . . | Φn ⊢ p | p, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | p, Ψm ⊢ Σm | p,Π ⊢ Λ
We want to find a derivation of
G | Φ, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | Φ, Ψm ⊢ Σm | Γ,Π ⊢ Λ
where Φ = Φ1, . . . , Φn. The induction hypothesis applied to the premises of the
cut gives us
G | Γ, Φ, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | Γ, Φ, Ψm ⊢ Σm
G | Φ, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | Φ, Ψm ⊢ Σm | Φ,Π ⊢ Λ
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We obtain the desired hypersequent by m successive applications of (cm).
(5) I is (∨ ⊢), or (∃ ⊢) applying to Φi or Ψi. Consider the case of (∨ ⊢), the
others are treated similarly. The premises of I are, for example,
G | A,Φ1 ⊢ p | Φ2 ⊢ p . . . | Φn ⊢ p | p, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | p, Ψm ⊢ Σm
G | B,Φ1 ⊢ p | Φ2 ⊢ p . . . | Φn ⊢ p | p, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | p, Ψm ⊢ Σm
By induction hypothesis, we obtain
G | A,Φ1, . . . , Φn, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | A,Φ1, . . . , Φn, Ψm ⊢ Σm
G | B,Φ1, . . . , Φn, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | B,Φ1, . . . , Φn, Ψm ⊢ Σm
It is not straightforwardly possible to derive the desired hypersequent from these.
If Ψi = {Pi1, . . . , Piki}, let Qi = Pi1 ⊃ . . . Piki ⊃ Σi. Then we do easily obtain,
however, the following by repeated application of (⊢⊃), (⊢ ∨) and (ec):
G | A,Φ1, . . . , Φn ⊢ Q1 ∨ . . . ∨Qm
G | B,Φ1, . . . , Φn ⊢ Q1 ∨ . . . ∨Qm
Now a single application of (∨ ⊢), plus (ec) gives us
K = G | A ∨B,Φ1, . . . , Φn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
⊢ Q1 ∨ . . . ∨Qm
Then we derive, using m− 1 cuts:
K
.... δ1
Q1 ∨Q ⊢ Q1 | Q1 ∨Q ⊢ Q
Γ ⊢ Q1 | Γ ⊢ Q2 ∨ . . . ∨Qm︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
....
Γ ⊢ Q1 | . . . | Γ ⊢ Qm−1 ∨Qm
.... δm−1
Qm−1 ∨Qm ⊢ Qm−1 | Qm−1 ∨Qm ⊢ Qm
Γ ⊢ Q1 | . . . | Γ ⊢ Qm
where δi is the derivation
Qi ⊢ Qi
Q ⊢ Q Qi ⊢ Qi
Q ⊢ Qi | Qi ⊢ Q
cm
Q ⊢ Q
Q ⊢ Qi | Qi ∨Q ⊢ Q
∨ ⊢
Qi ∨Qi+1 ∨ . . . ∨Qm︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
⊢ Qi | Qi ∨ . . . ∨Qm ⊢ Qi+1 ∨ . . . ∨Qm︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
∨ ⊢
The desired hypersequent is obtained by m cuts with
Qi, Pi1, . . . , Piki ⊢ Σi
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(6) I is a communication rule. This is the most involved case, as several
subcases have to be distinguished according to which of the two communicated
sequents contains p. Neither of these cases are problematic. We present two
examples:
(a) One of the communicated sequents contains p on the right. Then the
premises of I are
G | Φ1 ⊢ p | . . . | Φn ⊢ p | p, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | p, Ψm ⊢ Σm | Θ1, Θ′1 ⊢ p
G | Φ1 ⊢ p | . . . | Φn ⊢ p | p, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | p, Ψm ⊢ Σm | Θ2, Θ′2 ⊢ Ξ2
where. The induction hypothesis applies to these two hypersequents. If we write
Φ = Φ1, . . . , Φn, we have
G | Θ1, Θ′1, Φ, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | Θ1, Θ
′
1, Φ, Ψm ⊢ Σm
G | Θ2, Θ′2 ⊢ Ξ | Φ, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | Φ, Ψm ⊢ Σm
We obtain the desired result by applying m instances of (cm), internal weaken-
ings and external contractions as necessary, to obtain, in sequence
G | Θ1, Θ′2, Φ, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | Θ1, Θ
′
1, Φ, Ψm ⊢ Σm | Θ
′
1, Θ2 ⊢ Ξ
. . .
G | Θ1, Θ′2, Φ, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | Θ1, Θ
′
2, Φ, Ψm ⊢ Σm | Θ
′
1, Θ2 ⊢ Ξ
The sequents participating in the application of (cm) are marked by boxes. The
original end hypersequent follows from the last one by internal weakenings.
(b) The communicated sequents both contain p, once on the right, once on
the left. The premises of I are
G | Φ1 ⊢ p | . . . | Φn ⊢ p | p, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | p, Ψm ⊢ Σm | Θ1, Θ′1 ⊢ p
G | Φ1 ⊢ p | . . . | Φn ⊢ p | p, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | p, Ψm ⊢ Σm | p,Θ2, Θ′2 ⊢ Ξ
We have proofs of
G | Θ1, Θ′1, Φ, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | Θ1, Θ
′
1, Φ, Ψm ⊢ Σm
G | Φ, Ψ1 ⊢ Σ1 | . . . | Φ, Ψm ⊢ Σm | Θ2, Θ′2, Φ ⊢ Ξ
Again, a sequence of m applications of (cm), together with internal weakenings
and external contractions produces the desired end sequent. ⊓⊔
Note that in case (5), several new cuts are introduced. As a consequence, the
elimination procedure does not directly work for cut-free proofs. If a proof with
neither cut nor communication is required, the elimination procedure has to be
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combined with the cut-elimination procedure of Thm. 5. The additional cuts can
be avoided by replacing (∨ ⊢) and (∃ ⊢) by the following generalized rules:
G | A,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 | . . . | A,Γn ⊢ ∆n G | B,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 | . . . | B,Γn ⊢ ∆n
G | A ∨B,Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 | . . . | A ∨B,Γn ⊢ ∆n
∨ ⊢∗
G | A(a), Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 | . . . | A(a), Γn ⊢ ∆n
G | (∃x)A(x), Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 | . . . | (∃x)A(x), Γn ⊢ ∆n
∃ ⊢∗
These rules, however, cannot be simulated by the ordinary rules without using
cut (the simulation with cut is given in case (5)). By changing case (5) accord-
ingly, the elimination procedure will transform a cut-free HIF-derivation into a
cut-free one without (tt), but with (∨ ⊢∗) and (∃ ⊢∗).
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